Disasters Have a Way of Not Happening
In any period of uncertainty, it’s worth stepping back from the barrage of bad news and assessing the longer-term fundamentals.
That’s especially true when stress is high—when reaction becomes reflex and knee-jerk decisions can lock in damage that might have been avoided.
As mentioned earlier, there’s still a lot we don’t know about these tariffs, including what industries will be targeted or spared, how much pass-through will occur, and how long the measures will last. While we await more clarity, we can find perspective in what we do know and what it tells us: The road ahead may be uneven, but it’s not uncharted, and it’s far from hopeless.
The U.S. economy is like a tree—it just grows. Over the long run, economic growth is simply the sum of changes in the working-age population and productivity, and the U.S. has the best demographics in the developed world [ 4 ] and benefits from one of the strongest productivity stories anywhere. Its natural trajectory is toward growth, not contraction. Most estimates of long-run potential sit between 1.8% and 2.0%, and in my view, the current investment and productivity cycle offers upside to that range.
Investment, or future productivity, has been running nearly 50% higher since 2018 than the pre-COVID average.
What Can Investors Do? See the Opportunity
Portfolio diversification isn’t broken, but it’s being severely tested.
The traditional 60/40 portfolio already proved less reliable after the volatility of 2022 and 2023. A long period of negative correlation between stocks and bonds broke down as inflation and interest rates surged in 2022. Where investors once relied on bonds to provide ballast to equity volatility, both asset classes declined together.
That positive correlation persisted into 2023, as both stocks and bonds recovered, and it remained positive through most of 2024. Now, in the face of a sharp, policy-induced risk-off move, the usual safe havens aren’t behaving as expected. The U.S. dollar has swung wildly to a two-year low, and demand for 10-year Treasuries has been weak, pushing yields higher. Investors aren’t just repricing assets, they’re rethinking assumptions, and that’s much harder to reverse.
But periods like this one don’t just reveal stress, they also reveal opportunity. Uncertainty breeds volatility, and volatility creates dislocation, which is precisely when long-term investors typically lean in. That’s where private markets come in—not just for their historical resilience when public markets falter, but for their long-run return potential. Historically, some of the best private market vintages have emerged in the aftermath of economic shocks. When capital is scarce, pricing improves. When public markets are in retreat, private markets step in with resilience.
Private equity has a long track record of outperforming during downturns. Over the past several decades, private equity returns relative to the Russell 2000 tend to be strongest when public markets are weakest. During the Tech Bubble, the Global Financial Crisis, and other stress periods, private equity consistently delivered above-market returns. The average outperformance across recessionary downturns? 8.3 percentage points when public markets were down greater than 10%. That’s not marginal alpha—that’s compounding power.
US International Trade Commission (12/31/2024), Yale Budget Lab (4/9/2025) and Bloomberg. The proposed tariff rate is measured pre-substitution. Assuming there are no shifts in the import shares of different countries, the 2025 tariffs to date are the equivalent of a 24.6 percentage point increase in the US average effective tariff rate. This increase would bring the overall US average effective tariff rate to 27%, the highest since 1903. This assumes imports from China remain at 14% of total US imports, consistent with their 2024 share, and that the newly announced 125% tariff applies to a specific subset of goods from China. The “reciprocal” tariff rates announced on April 2 and effective April 9 have been suspended for 90 days. During this period, a 10% minimum tariff applies universally to the countries and product categories covered in the April 2 announcement, excluding China. For China, the April 2 reciprocal tariff increases to 125%, and when combined with the existing 20% IEEPA tariff, results in a maximum rate of 145% on the April 2 base. For commodities excluded from the April 2 announcement but subject to existing tariffs (e.g., steel, aluminum, automobiles), a 45% rate applies. For other carve-outs like lumber, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors, the current applicable rate is 20%.
US Census Bureau and Macrobond, as of 2/28/2020.
US Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bloomberg, as of 3/31/2025. Represents the share of total CPI components with rising prices on an annual basis, indicating the breadth of inflation.
US Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Comparison of Annual Labor Force Statistics, as of 1/21/2025.
US Federal Reserve and Bloomberg, as of 12/31/2024.
Bloomberg, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, as of 12/31/2023. Labor productivity represents non-farm business sector labor productivity. Post-tech bubble is from 3/31/2002 to 9/30/2007. Post-GFC is from 9/30/2009 to 9/30/2019.
US Bureau of Economic Analysis, as of 12/31/2024. Intellectual Property Products represent non-residential related investment. Equipment represents both residential and non-residential.
The Blackstone CEO survey referred to herein is a survey of a subset of portfolio company CEOs. For Q1’2025, the survey reflects responses from 92 Blackstone portfolio companies (56 U.S. CEOs) largely within Blackstone’s private equity and credit businesses (the “CEO Survey”). Note that survey composition varies from quarter to quarter. The CEO Survey was initiated on March 11, 2025, and closed March 24, 2025. The responding portfolio companies are not necessarily a representative sample of companies across Blackstone’s portfolio and the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of Blackstone. The views expressed reflect the responding CEOs’ views as of the date of their responses, and Blackstone does not undertake any responsibility to advise you of any changes in such views. References to “CEO” or “CEOs” herein refer to respondents to the Q1’2025 Blackstone CEO survey.
Portfolio company data reflects corporate private equity operating companies as of 3/31/2025. Excludes select public investments, select Energy investments, select FIG investments, certain new investments, investments where YoY growth rates are not comparable due to divestures and certain other companies for which timely forecasts are unavailable.
US Federal Reserve, as of 9/30/2024.
Blackstone Investment Strategy Calculations, Cambridge Associates and Bloomberg, as of June 30, 2023. Private Equity is measured using the Cambridge Associates US Private Equity Index. Russell 2000 performance is shown as Modified Public Market Equivalent (mPME) which is a public market equivalent methodology developed in-house by Cambridge Associates. The methodology provides a consistent means to affect a performance comparison between a private investment and public alternative. The relative performance is measured as a ratio of returns over 12 months rolling period. Grey shaded areas represent NBER defined recessions. We calculate the relative performance as a ratio and annualize it assuming continuous compounding. The table looks at the following periods: “Early 90s” recession figures are based on calculations from September 1989 to December 1991; “Tech Bubble” figures are based on calculations from March 2000 to September 2002; “Great Financial Crisis” figures are based on calculations from December 2006 to March 2010; “COVID-19” figures are based on calculations from December 2018 to March 2021.
S&P and NFI-ODCE Index, as of December 31, 2024. Covers annual total returns during S&P drawdowns since 1980 (1981, 1990, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2018 and 2022).